This paper shows that two-period cycles arise endogenously when contracts are incomplete and when products are experience goods. Then firms invest in the quality of their output in order to establish a good reputation. Cyclical equilibria arise because investment in reputation causes self-fullfilling changes in the discount factor. Cycles are more likely to occur when information diffuses slowly and consumers exhibit high risk aversion.
Introduction
A seller's reputation is often the only guarantee of quality of its products or services. By the same token, reputation building is often the seller's only incentive to deliver on quality. This is why consumers are willing to pay a premium for goods and services from established brands.
Underprovision of quality today will be punished by lower prices in the future, and a positive surprise will be rewarded. Because of this, the seller's market value depends partly on his reputation or "brand value", an intangible component of his capital stock. 1 Since reputational investment today pays off in the future, a seller's incentive to maintain or improve his reputation depends on his discount factor. And when the seller is risk averse, his discount factor depends negatively on his consumption growth. We show that if the seller is unable to smooth his consumption by other means, this force can give rise to cycles.
For a two-period cycle the intuition is simple. In a recession, current consumption is low relative to future consumption which means that the discount factor is also low. This reduces the incentive to create a good reputation and the recession is self fulfilling. Conversely, current consumption in a boom is higher than future consumption, which means that the discount factor is also high and so the boom too is self fulfilling. In other words, the discount factor and reputational concerns are pro-cyclical because consumption growth is counter-cyclical.
We embed this mechanism into a general equilibrium model and study how investment in reputation affects aggregate outcomes. The model has no direct externalities and no aggregate shocks, but output will oscillate. Cycles are sustainable because investment is always below its output-maximizing level, a wedge that is driven by the delay with which reputation reacts to investment. This market failure implies that investment in quality and output are positively correlated.
Consumption and investment are therefore both pro-cyclical, a basic feature of business cycles which is difficult to reconcile with canonical models of deterministic fluctuations based on multi-sectoral economies, such as Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) , or on replacement echoes, such as Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro (1997) . Besides these raw correlations, our model is also consistent with a series of stylized facts about business cycles. First, it predicts that output is more volatile than consumption but less than investment. Second, since the technology for producing quality exhibits decreasing returns, markups are counter-cyclical which is consistent with evidence in Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and the subsequent literature. Third, product quality is pro-cyclical as recently documented by Broda and Weinstein (2010) . Finally our model predicts that an inverted yield curve precedes recessions (Ang, Piazzesi and Wei, 2006) .
To go beyond qualitative insights, we use micro-data on firm dynamic to parametrize our model. We explain how variance parameters can be recovered from estimates in Castro et al.
(2015) about the evolution of TFP at the plant level. The speed at which consumers update their beliefs determines the length of the period. Setting it equal to the average frequency of 56 months separating booms and busts, we find that the calibrated parameters fall well within the region where cycles arise endogenously. Hence our model does not require extreme parameter values in order to generate deterministic fluctuations. In particular, cycles with a frequency of 56 months are sustainable whenever the annual discount factor is below 0 977, a number well above the upper-bounds of the competitive equilibrium models surveyed in Boldrin and Woodford (1990) . This finding is in line with recent research pointing out that market imperfections considerably widen the range of discount factors compatible with endogenous fluctuations. For example, Beaudry et al. (2015) find that adding strategic complementarities to a standard DSGE model allows them to generate limit cycles that match US business cycle fluctuations in employment and output. Our analysis shows that pecuniary externalities can lead to a similar conclusion, so that complementarities do not have to be directly embedded in the structure of the economy.
Although ours is a general equilibrium paper targeting aggregate business cycles, we begin the paper by showing that cyclical equilibria arise in Holmström's (1999) partial equilibrium setting too if the agent is risk averse and cannot borrow or lend. So, while important extensions have been made on the learning process (e.g., Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013), we show that new insights arise under risk aversion. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 deals with partial equilibrium where the mechanism is more transparent while Section 4 deals with general equilibrium. Section 5 explains how the model can be parametrized, and shows that cycles arise for realistic parameters values. Then we review major hypotheses for endogenous fluctuations in Section 6 so as to highlight the novelty of reputation cycles.
A model of firm reputation
We build on Holmström (1999) where a risk-neutral agent faces a spot market with risk-neutral buyers. The unique equilibrium then entails a monotonic time path of effort. We will now show that if one assumes that the agent is risk averse, multiple equilibria arise and in some of them effort follows a 2-period cycle. In partial equilibrium our mechanism requires the following assumptions:
A1. Incomplete agency contracts with non-contractible effort and output; A2. Risk averse agent facing risk-neutral principals; A3. Agent's preferences have no wealth effect (CARA utility); A4. Agent cannot borrow or lend.
In general equilibrium A4 is replaced by the fact that the economy is closed, and because of insurance possibilities among agents we can drop A3 and work with CRRA utility.
Set-up
Each period an agent -"the firm" -produces output by exerting hidden effort :
Here ∼ (0 2 ) is an i.i.d. shock. The variable is the firm's efficiency. is unknown, even to the the firm itself, and the common prior is N (0 2 ).
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Contracts in which the period-payment is contingent on are not feasible. Instead, buyers pay the firm up front and the payment reflects the market's beliefs at the beginning of the period. Thus a firm exerts effort only so as to raise its future income, and so we refer to as "investment." The firm's output has a persistent effect on prices because it affects the market's belief about the firm's efficiency. A firm's efficiency fluctuates over time as
Each period the agent chooses an from the feasible set A ⊂ R + and everyone observes .
The agent can infer its + but not its components. The market's participants observe only, but since they will infer from equilibrium, they too will be able to infer + .
Within a period, events unfold as follows:
2 It seems reasonable to assume that on path the firm does not know any more than its customers about quality of product it is producing. The firm knows the resources, , it devotes to maintaining quality, but it is customers' willingness to pay that reveals how successful its efforts have been.
The normalization to zero of the prior's mean is made for analytical convenience. We relax it and let average productivity differs from zero when we parametrize the model in Section 5.
1. The firm auctions its prospective output to the highest bidder. Buyers are identical and risk neutral, and they get zero rents; the up-front payment then is ( | ) where
=0 is the firm's public history.
2. The firm chooses , privately.
3. Its output is realized, and it becomes part of its history.
At date , everyone knows the history
=0 from the creation date 0 of the firm up to the last period of production − 1. Let * denote the firm's equilibrium action. We conjecture that there exists an equilibrium such that the action depends on only, and not on .
A sufficient statistic for the information revealed about is the sequence ≡ ( 0 −1 ), where ≡ − * = + . The variable is treated as the signal and it is normally distributed.
So is the posterior over , i.e., ∼ N ¡

¢
The two parameters of the posterior evolve as follows. The posterior variance is deterministic:
In the long-run, the posterior precision converges to its stationary level¯ −2 , whose value is
Observe that ¯ −2 0 and ¯ −2 0 as fluctuations in output and efficiency lower the stationary precision.
The posterior mean follows the process
Thus, by deviating from its anticipated action * , a firm can manipulate its market reputation, and * is an equilibrium action precisely when the firm rejects that option.
Firm-type heterogeneity at age 0 is 2 . Because the shocks are normal, the cross-sectional distribution of remains normal at all dates. If 2 were arbitrary, the variance of would depend on the age of the firm. Assume, however, that at birth a firm's is drawn from 
Incentives
The agent is risk averse and infinitely lived. We focus on deterministic solutions of his opti-
where ∈ A and (·) is an increasing, twice differentiable, cost function, measured in terms of goods. Consumption in each period is equal to revenues ( | ) = + * net of the investment cost ( ). Hence we have implicitly assumed that:
( ) the agent cannot smooth his income through borrowing and lending, ( ) the action is hidden. It can be investment in terms of goods that is subtracted from current consumption. Or it be a hidden effort choice with utility being of the form ( − ( )) as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988).
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( ) For the problem in (6), deterministic policies are optimal if ( ) is in the CARA class and if the shocks to the firm's income are permanent. Income shocks, which reflect the history of will in turn be permanent because buyers are risk neutral and because their beliefs have the martingale property.
Taking { * } ∞ = as given, application of Bayes rule and repeated substitution for yields the following incentive constraint:
The LHS is the marginal cost, and the RHS is the discounted benefit because a deviation from * to * + 1 would raise the posterior mean at date by
. 4 Since is increasing in and is a martingale, expected consumption depends 3 In the GE section we shall adopt the first interpretation. 4 Eq. (7) is the counterpart of Holmström's (1999), eq. (22) . The essential difference is the term
on the firm's current reputation. Hence the optimality condition (7) varies with and its fluctuations usually precludes the emergence of deterministic actions. But this contradicts our premise that * is a function of time only. To ensure that the expected ratio of marginal utilities does not depend on the current level of consumption, we have to neutralize the wealth effect.
Paradoxically, the wealth effect is easier to eliminate in general equilibrium where we assume that a representative family insures its members against wealth shocks. There we shall work with CRRA preferences. In partial equilibrium, however, we deal with one agent who cannot insure his income, and we shall assume that the agent's utility function is CARA. With either assumption, the agent's discount factor no longer depends on his reputation.
Cycles in partial equilibrium
Following the discussion above, in this section we assume utility is CARA:
Then using (8) and (5), in the expression (7) the term cancels out because it is the forecastable component of . We obtain an incentive constraint that is consistent with deterministic actions since (7) becomes equivalent to
with ≡ exp
Note that because consumption is stochastic and because 000 (·) 0. Consumption volatility thus raises expected marginal utility in future periods, especially when is large. We ensure that expected returns are bounded by focusing on cases where 1 . Suppose that ( ) = with ∈ (0 1). At a steady-state in which 0, (9) would have to hold as an equality. The incentive compatibility of such a steady-state requires that 
Cycles are sustainable because the discount factor fluctuates procyclically. High = entails above-normal output and consumption, leading to a low marginal utility 0 ( ). The opposite is true next period as +1 = 0 delivers low consumption and relatively high marginal
is large today, and this justifies the higher investment in reputation building. A similar but opposite mechanism operates in the next period, making low investment optimal. The oscillations of the discount factor capture the willingness of the agent to smooth consumption. Since the benefits of his action only accrue in the following period, he finds it optimal to transfer resources from good to bad times by overinvesting. Figure 1 shows that the amplitude of cycles is decreasing in and To interpret these negative correlations, it is helpful to decompose 5 the incentive constraint (9) as follows
5 See proof of Proposition 1 for a derivation of (10) The only impact of on the incentive constraint (10) is to raise the ratio of marginal utilities between bad and good times. Investment adjusts until the overall returns on the RHS of (10) equals marginal costs . Since patient agents are more concerned about their reputation, the required wedge between marginal utilities is decreasing in which leads in turn to lower equilibrium values for . Somewhat paradoxically, the amplitude of cycles is decreasing in the power of incentives. A similar channel holds for because, as explained above, the effective rate of time preference is increasing in . This mechanism is reinforced by the positive impact that has on the curvature of the utility function. When agents are more risk averse, similar oscillations in consumption generate greater swings in the discount factor which lowers the value of needed to restore incentive compatibility.
Turnover of firms and cycle amplitude.-Firms' revenues and profits are constantly reshuffled by changes in their efficiencies, . Thus we can use the volatility of as a proxy for firm turnover. Figure 2 shows that a rise in such idiosyncratic volatility lowers the systematic cycling of firms' outputs. When a firm's productivity is less stable, agents put more weight on the quality of its recent output. This strengthens reputational concerns and, as explained above, reduces the amplitude of cycles. 
Cycles in general equilibrium
We now move to general equilibrium. We keep the production technology (1) and the assumptions about ( ) summarized by (2)- (5). We also keep assumptions A1 and A2 but we drop A3 which is not needed in GE, and replace A4 with the requirement that the economy is closed.
Since cycles are now in aggregate consumption and since the economy is closed, agents cannot smooth them. 6 
Set-up
Firms' aggregate distribution.-We make two simplifying assumptions which ensure that the distribution of firm types remains constant over time. As in the previous section, we assume that firms draw their s from N (0 ¯ 2 ), with¯ 2 being equal to the stationary precision given in (4). Then posterior precision remains constant over time so that the firm's individual state is just . 7 To obtain a stationary distribution for we also assume that firms are randomly hit by a death shock with probability per period. As =¯ is a constant, (5) implies that a firm's state follows a random walk with a constant incremental variance. Since a firm's lifetime is a geometrically distributed random variable and an additional period of life adds (1 − ) 2 2 to the variance of , the stationary variance of is
and the time-invariant distribution of types reads
where Φ ( ) is the standard normal CDF.
Product markets.-The risk-averse household fully diversifies its purchases of goods over firms so as to eliminate the risk in the random variable − + . Any firm's product is marginal to the family, and it pays up front the expected value of output for it. Since all market participants observe the history of outputs, and the sequence of equilibrium actions * is common knowledge, firm has revenue = + * , and profit
where (·) is a convex cost function. The firm pays its profits out as dividends to its shareholders. We show below that the normality of beliefs ensures that, as in Holmström's (1999) model, optimal investment * does not depend on .
Preferences and assets.-The only store of value are shares of firms. Then the representative family chooses at each a sequence of share vectors ( ) ∈R to maximize its expected utility "
where is consumption and the discount factor. Let denote the price of shares of firms of type . Assuming the family starts with a representative portfolio consisting of unit ownership of all firms, and that it buys shares of firm , the period budget constraint reads
On the RHS of (14), the first term is the dividend. The last term is an exogenous endowment of new firms that all have the prior mean normalized to zero; these replace the fraction that are about to die before the next period starts, and they are sold to the public at the IPO price of 0 . The middle term is the net outlay on the 1 − firms that it owns from the previous period. The market for securities is in equilibrium when = 1 for all which means that the family buys the market portfolio. From the FOCs to the problem defined by (13) and (14) we get the market value, , of each firm reported in eq. (15).
Dividends.-The family takes the dividend process as given. Firm 's dividends, given in (12), depend on , and the latter is chosen by managers who maximize the market value of their firms. The value of a firm with market posterior is given by
where ≡ (1 − ) is the discount factor adjusted for the risk of market exit. The pricing formula (15) presumes that the manager will take the equilibrium action * +1 . Dividends can be negative with a small probability, and so can prices. Negative prices arise, e.g., in the market for credit-default swaps which entail the equivalent of negative dividend paymentsSee Atkeson, Eisfeldt and Weill (2014).
We will maintain (15) for all in the stationary distribution given in (11) and will later
show that, at the calibrated parameter values, the fraction of firms with negative realizations is negligible. 8 The market portfolio.-The market portfolio consists of all firms. Its value is
where Υ ( ) defined in (11), is the steady state distribution of . The aggregate dividends are equal to
The market portfolio always pays a positive dividend, so that 0. The family takes as exogenous, since its own firms are negligible compared to the economy. A share of incumbent firms are destroyed in each period. They are replaced by new firms that draw their quality from the stationary distribution N (0 ¯ 2 ). Thus if we use ( 0 ) to denote the IPO price of the newly arrived firms and the aggregate stock index, we obtain the following expression for the family's period budget constraint
As in Lucas (1978) , the market for securities is in equilibrium when = 1 for all A firm's decision problem.-A manager maximizes the value of his firm net of the cost ( ) That is, he maximizes − ( ) so that his incentive constraint is identical to (7) except that consumption is deterministic. Indeed, the incentive problem is simpler in a macro setting because the representative family owns the market portfolio whose value depends only on the aggregate efficiency. The perfect diversification in assets holding combined with the atomicity of firms ensure that idiosyncratic variations in efficiency and reputation wash out. This is why we no longer need CARA preferences to derive deterministic policies. 
where = * − ( * ) and = (1 − ). The economy always has a rest-point solution
The model has a unique equilibrium when consumers are risk neutral. By contrast, when 00 (·) 0, the model has other equilibria, some of which are cyclical.
Stability and cycles
Assume now that ( ) is strictly convex with 0 (0) = 0. This ensures that the incentive constraint (7) always admits an interior solution for . Thus we can substitute in the expression
¢ on the RHS of (19) so as to obtain a recursive FOC
The recursive incentive constraint highlights that an additional unit of effort today has two benefits:
( ) It raises + 1 earnings by (1 − ), and ( ) it enables the firm to maintain the same reputation in + 2 and beyond while reducing its investment in period + 1 by units.
Both benefits are converted into today's utils through multiplication by the discount factor 0 ( +1 ) 0 ( ). Setting * +1 equal to * yields the rest point solutionˆ
Efficient investment would require instead that = 0−1 (1). Since is smaller than one, 0−1 (1) and investment at the steady-state is suboptimal because costs are paid up-front, whereas reputational benefits accrue slowly over time. This is why rate at which agents discount the future drives a wedge between optimal and actual investment.
Stability of the steady-state.-Under risk neutrality, the steady-state is always unstable and any other action thanˆ generates diverging trajectories. In other words,ˆ is the unique rational expectation solution. By contrast, when the agent is risk averse, the steady-state can be locally stable. Then, for any initial action 0 in the neighborhood ofˆ , the solution converges back tô so that the equilibrium is indeterminate. The condition under which equilibrium multiplicity arises is laid-out in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Assume that ( ) is strictly convex with 0 (0) = 0. Then the steady-stateˆ is locally stable, and the model's equilibrium is indeterminate, if and only if
where ( ) = − 00 ( ) 0 ( ) is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the utility function.
Since the LHS of (22) does not depend on the risk aversion of consumers, the steady-state is stable whenever is smaller than some threshold value. The impact of risk aversion, as measured by the term on the RHS of (22), is proportional to 1 − 0 (ˆ ). Thus risk aversion becomes irrelevant when the steady state and the first best coincide. Intuitively, the curvature of the utility function matters only to the extent that changes in investment affect consumption.
At the optima, benefits and costs are set equal and a marginal increase in leaves consumption unchanged. But sinceˆ is suboptimal, raising investment increases consumption and reduces marginal utility. This makes it more attractive to invest today in order to raise tomorrow's consumption, which explains why a one time increase in investment is followed by a drop and a return to the steady state when the curvature of the utility function is high enough. Proposition (4) formalizes this insight for the most common classes of utility functions.
Corollary 4
Assume that the utility function is either CARA, i.e., ( ) = − (− ), or CRRA, i.e., ( ) = 1− (1 − ), with 0. Then the dynamic system eventually becomes locally stable as exceeds the bifurcation point˜ ( ).
The model exhibits a flip bifurcation so that a period 2 cycle coexists with the steady state solution as gets close enough to the critical value˜ . At the bifurcation point˜ , the rest point becomes unstable and there are no other stable solutions in its neighborhood. Figure   3 separates the ( ) plane into a stable and an unstable region. As stated in Proposition 4, there exists a value of above which the steady-state is always stable. The discount factor has an opposite impact than since the equilibrium is stable when is smaller than some threshold. This is intuitive because an increase in lowers the degree of absolute risk aversion through its positive effect on output. More patient firms invest more in their reputation, which raises output and generates a wealth effect that renders agents less risk averse. This mechanism is not operative when preferences, instead of being CRRA as in our example, display constant absolute risk aversion. Then the relationship between the discount factor and the stability of the equilibrium becomes ambiguous.
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Deterministic cycles.-Besides the continuum of converging paths in the neighborhood of the steady-state, the model also features global cycles of period 2. The reason why they arise is most easily grasped considering a phase portrait generated by the incentive constraint (21).
As shown in Figure 4 , instead of the one-to-one mapping prevailing under risk neutrality, we obtain a correspondence associating a pair of incentive compatible +1 to any . The incentive constraint is satisfied by two different +1 because tomorrow's investment affects the discount factor and the marginal costs in opposite ways whenever +1 is below its efficient level. Then increasing +1 raises tomorrow's consumption, which lowers the discount factor and counteracts the increase in marginal costs 0 ( +1 ). When the elasticity of the discount factor with respect to +1 is higher than that of the marginal costs, it is possible to perturb a pair of sustainable actions and restore incentive compatibility by adjusting +1 until its effect on the discount factor offsets the change in marginal costs. 9 See the technical appendix for an analysis of the effect of on equilibrium stability under both CARA and CRRA preferences. For the economy to settle down at the rest pointˆ , the expectation-formation mechanism has to select the lower branch of the phase portrait. By contrast, 2-period cycles arise when expectations oscillate between the upper and lower branch. 10 Hence we will refer to them as regime switching equilibria.
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The reason why cycles are sustainable is the same as in the partial equilibrium model with linear costs: Procyclical fluctuations of the discount factor make it optimal to invest during booms and reduce expenses during busts. This mechanism is also closely related to the one rendering the steady-state locally stable. Proposition 5 shows that the two phenomena are indeed driven by the same forces. Combining Propositions 3 and 5, we see that cycles can arise when consumers are sufficiently risk averse.
Proposition 5 Assume that: (i) the utility function is either CARA or CRRA; (ii) the cost function is quadratic, i.e., ( ) = 2 2. Then deterministic 2-period cycles are sustainable whenever the steady-state is locally stable. 10 There are of course models in which an extrinsic or even intrinsic shock acts so as to shift an economy from one regime to another (e.g., Hamilton 1990 ). Here we assume that such switches of regime alternate in a deterministic manner. 11 The terminology is borrowed from Christiano and Harrison (1999) . Notice that regime switching cycles differ from local cycles emerging in the neighborhood of the bifurcation point˜ , as the latter arise when expectations always select the lower branch of the phase portrait.
Cyclical properties of key variables-Among other properties, the following have some empirical support.
1. Output is more volatile than consumption but less than investment: Aggregate output is by definition equal to the sum of consumption = − ( ) and investment ( ). Thus it is certainly smoother than investment since the latter is a convex function of . Consumption being given by the difference between the two, it has to fluctuate less than output.
2. Markups are counter-cyclical: By definition markup = price cost = ( ), it is therefore decreasing in because ( ) is convex. Since is procyclical, the markup is countercyclical as documented in Rotemberg and Woodford (1991).
3. Product quality is pro-cyclical: Product quality is just plus the average value of and, since the latter is fixed, quality is procyclical as recently documented by Broda and Weinstein (2010). Other equilibria.-We have focused on deterministic cycles of period 2. They are only one of the many potential outcomes of our model which literally features a continuum of equilibria, i.e., a continuum of sequences { } solving (17), (19) and (20) . For example, one could construct more sophisticated regime switching patterns where actions are determined by the lower branch for a given number of periods, then followed by a sojourn of a certain length on the upper branch, and so on. Moreover, the switching condition does not have to depend on time alone but could instead be conditional on the current action. Besides deterministic equilibria, the model is also able to generate sunspot equilibria. When the steady-state is stable, sunspots equilibria that only use the lower branch can be constructed using standard arguments in the sunspot literature. More sophisticated behavior may also occur when the economy stochastically switches between the upper and lower branches. Christiano and Harrison (1999) provides an in-depth analysis of regime switching sunspot equilibria in a model whose geometric structure is related to ours. We leave a comprehensive investigation of all equilibrium outcomes to further research and focus instead on the simplest form of regime switching cycles. We evaluate their ability to match business cycles in the next section where we parametrize and simulate our model.
Calibration to micro data
Parametrization
We now show that the model produces realistic fluctuations when parameters are chosen to fit micro data. The most important of these is period length, which depends on how fast the firm's history becomes public. We discuss this parameter last after all other dimensions of the model have been parametrized. 
where is the log-TFP for plant at time as estimated from a first stage regression of real sales on capital, labor and materials. X is a vector of observables that are systematically related to innovations in TFP. 12 Equation (23) is the empirical counterpart 13 of the Martingale
where is the vintage of firm . Since the survival probability of firms follows a geometric distribution, the cross-sectional variance of is given by
As only depends on and , one can use the autocorrelation coefficient and the crosssectional dispersion of TFP to identify both volatility coefficients. More precisely, we estimate ( ) by solving two equations involving and its autocorrelation as follows: months with a loss in GDP from peak to through of around 8%. 15 These two targets are perfectly matched when the average efficiency of firms¯ = 1 06. (see the discussion of the bifurcation point below). For this average efficiency, the normality of output is not a concern anymore because the share of firms with negative valuation is negligible.
16 12 Castro et al. (2015) control for the industry in which firms operate as well as their size and age. 13 The dependent variable +1 in Eq. (23) can be interpreted as a log-linear approximation of its theoretical counterpart +1 . The approximation being taken around the average value¯ , it will be accurate when¯ is close to one, a requirement that is satisfied by our calibration since our preferred value for¯ is 1.06.
14 Equation (24) follows reinserting = + and = −1 + into the law of motions of beliefs (5). 15 Source material available at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 16 In our benchmark calibration, only one out of 10 thousands firms has negative value.
The only remaining parameter is the subjective discount rate . Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) estimate the "direct costs" of a product recall by assuming that all of the defective units become worthless on recall. We interpret a recall as a negative surprise amounting to an output drop equal to the direct cost. The direct cost is then a subtraction from today's dividend, and eq. (15) along with the martingale property of imply that should fall by an amount
(1 − ) = 12 where = (1 − ). Jarrell and Peltzman, p. 521, estimate this number to be 12 which is matched by our values for and . Our choice of parameters is summarized in 
Period length
The speed of learning determines the length of the period and, hence, time between booms and recessions. Customer switching costs also would determine the speed with which information about a firm's quality can change its demand. For the set of parameters summarized in Table   5 1, the bifurcation point˜ has a value of 0 708. Whether or not this is a reasonable discount factor depends on the frequency at which consumers update their beliefs, i.e., the speed with which information about a firm's performance leaks out to the general public. Let denote the duration of the model's period in years, so that = + + P solution solely through its impact on the discount factor . Then˜ = (˜ ) ( (1 − )) = 4 27 is the period length above which endogenous cycles may occur. Figure 5 illustrates the effect that the speed of learning -i.e., period length -has on cycles.
Investment in the low and high phases of the cycle, as well as in the steady-state, is reported in the left side panel. As the period duration rises the amplitude of the oscillation increases and, as can be seen in the right side panel, generates widening fluctuations in consumption.
Using our yearly estimates for both and reported in Table 5 .1, one can directly infer the yearly updating frequency. All flow parameter values in Table 5 .1 are stated at a yearly frequency. Now, the peak-to-trough in output per capita time distance is 56 months or 56 12 = 4 7 years. Since this exceeds the value 4 27 model is capable of generating cycles at this frequency. Then the 4 7-year discount factor is˜ = .97 56 12 = 0 87, and the 4 7-year exit rate is˜ = 1 − (1 − 0 05) 56 12 = 0 21 At this updating frequency, cycles raise average reputational investment by 4 1%. The output gain nearly compensates the cost of income volatility as welfare decreases by only 0 7%, a loss that is equivalent to a compensating variation of 0 25%
in consumption.
Micro evidence shows reputation-diffusion lags can be on either side of the 4.7 years thresh-old, depending on what type of product or service is involved. In other words, the 4.7 diffusion lag that the macro data call for is well within the range of what the micro data say. We now discuss some evidence from the micro data.
Product age at recall as a measure of period length
Using data on automobile and drug recalls, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) find that a firm's stock price plunges when it recalls one of its products, roughly at the same time. Thus information about the firm's quality implied by the recall spreads no faster and no slower than the product recall. 17 We updated the auto recall data from the Department of Transportation, obtaining 48,000 cases. We measure the difference between the "start of manufacture" of the product and the product's recall date to be 4.14 years. This number is within 4 14 4 7 = 88% of the peak-to-trough business cycle distance. Details are in Appendix 2. The Appendix Fig. 7 shows the frequency distribution of the ages of the products -there is considerable heterogeneity in the products' ages at recall, suggesting differences in the speed at which information spreads.
Cyclical behavior of recalls.-If low quality products are more likely to be produced when is low, i.e., in a recession, then product recalls should be higher in the boom, one period later.
That is what our model predicts: Recalls and consumption should be positively correlated, and they are. We construct a time series of recalls and correlate it with aggregate consumptionboth series logged and detrended. Over the period 1978-2007 the correlation is 0.30, and the series are shown in Fig. 6 .
Diffusion of innovations
Product-adoption lags are estimated in the marketing literature and a popular formulation is the Bass model which can be summarized by is market-penetration function , with = 1 denoting full penetration.
= ( + ) (1 − )
17 Contrast that to evidence on mergers where the price of the target rises several months ahead of the merger announcement. With recall announcements the effect is more or less simultaneous. To the extent that customers must pay switching costs, these estimates overstate the lags in customer response at the intensive margin. One can buy less from a supplier than before, even though it is the same supplier.
Diffusion of advertising messages
Advertising infuses information among market participants much faster, in a matter of months (Dube, Hitsch and Machanda, 2005) . This is to be expected, however, because unlike the diffusion of quality information among customers which is generally incidental to other activities they engage in, advertising is an activity the sole intention of which is to inform.
Related models
The literature on deterministic cycles is vast and Boldrin and Woodford (1990) provide a survey.
We shall discuss six related hypotheses for cycles of which the first is by far the closest. effort today raises an agent's income in the future, and that it raises current output so that marginal utility of today's consumption falls and the discount factor rises. By contrast, however, LBD means that higher output today also raises productivity and output tomorrow which causes the discount factor to fluctuate countercyclically, thereby defeating the possibility of endogenous cycle. In our model, by contrast, today's effort affects an agent's income only off the equilibrium path of play, and this leads the discount factor to be procyclical.
Let us construct a version of LBD that can easily be compared to our model. Let denote the stock of firm-specific human capital and the investment in human capital, again measured in terms of goods. To make the comparison with our model as straightforward as possible, we assume that = + − ( ) and,
In the reputation mechanism, although investment does not affect tomorrow's productivity, it raises future income because it raises perceived productivity. In the LBD mechanism, by contrast, investment actually does raise future productivity since it increases the stock of human capital. This fact alone will lead the models to behave differently in general, especially in their Here, however, we shall only contrast the models' abilities to deliver endogenous cycles.
We shall show that the LBD model produces not the pro-cyclical movements in the discount factor that are central to our mechanism, but counter-cyclical ones. The divergence is due to two reasons: ( ) in the LBD model activity is higher than its current output-maximizing level, whereas in our model the opposite is true, ( ) in the LBD model activity has a lasting effect on the technological frontier. The first point immediately follows from the FOC for . Call the value of that maximizes current output. Then solves 0 ( ) = 1. But the firm is forward looking and sets to maximize its discounted profits so that
The FOC is nearly identical to the one prevailing in our model, with the gain parameter being replaced by the depreciation rate of human capital . Since is between 0 and 1, the RHS of (25) is greater than 1, and therefore exceeds its short-run output-maximizing level . Therefore increases in always lower current consumption , raising the marginal utility of consumption and thereby lowering the discount factor. This contemporaneous effect is reinforced by the positive impact of on the stock of human capital which raises tomorrow's consumption.
Taken together, these two channels imply that the fluctuations of the discount factor are counter-cyclical in the LBD model. It is easily verified that such a pattern makes it impossible to construct deterministic cycles of period 2 that are consistent with the FOC (25) . Hence, in spite of its apparent similarity with the reputation mechanism, LBD exerts a stabilizing force that prevents the emergence of endogenous cycles.
In fairness we may note that changing our production form to be multiplicative so that instead of (1) we assumed = + would dampen the cycles or perhaps eliminate them, for reasons similar to the above discussion of LBD: Exertion of effort today would then raises the incentive to also exert effort tomorrow; but that would raise tomorrow's consumption and the discount factor would decline. In other words, we may then lose the procyclicality of the discount factor.
2.
Vintage capital echo effects.-Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro (1997), Mitra, Ray and Roy (1990). When the age distribution of capital has spikes and when intertemporal substitution in consumption is high enough, investment can have echo effects that take a long time to die out. Permanent investment cycles arise only if utility is linear. Even then, this implies a (counterfactual) negative correlation between consumption and investment over time.
3. Two sectors and intertemporal substitution of consumption.-In a two sector model in which production of the consumption good is capital intensive compared to that of the capital good, an abundance of capital today raises consumption today and lowers investment and capital tomorrow, at which point the process is reversed. Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) show this mechanism works if the factor intensities differ sufficiently, and if the utility function is not too concave.
4. Innovation cycles.-A class of models endogenizes their arrival. Judd (1985) and Matsuyama (1999) who also adds capital accumulation. These models typically feature alternating periods of competition and monopoly. Periods of monopoly of the successful innovators last until the monopoly's product is imitated by competitors. In our model the market structure is competitive, and the mechanism is a pecuniary spillover which brings us to the next class of models.
5. Implementation cycles.-The common force in our model and Shleifer (1986) is a strategic complementarity induced by a pecuniary external effect. Its source is quite different, however, in that our market structure is competitive and firms produce the same product. In Shleifer's external effect it is essential that innovating firms have monopoly power; it arises as consumers spend the profits of one innovator on buying output produced by other innovators. This leads firms to implement their innovations simultaneously. Another feature is exogenous technological change in the form of idea arrivals. We have no technological change. Finally, Shleifer (1986) needs ≤ 1 if his model is to have cycles. By contrast, for us any 1 produces cycles.
6. Discount-factor shocks.-It is customary to allow fluctuations in the discount factor (i.e., in eq. (6)), and that sometimes that factor should even exceed unity. Some of the models such as Werning (2012) firms with a hidden reputational concern at entry but no further hidden actions thereafter. They focus on how reputational investment of entrants into an industry responds to aggregate shocks.
Conclusion
We have shown that two-period cycles may arise when contracts are incomplete -one cannot condition payment on output -and when products are experience goods. For the mechanism to work the economy must be closed or, at the micro level, borrowing and lending are not possible. Calibrated to fit some micro facts, the model produces realistic fluctuations in terms of peak-to-trough movements in consumption and the spacing of time between recessions. The frequency of booms and recessions depends on the speed with which reputations spread -the slower the diffusion, the longer is the inter-arrival time of recessions.
APPENDIX
Proof. Proposition 1: Let us first show thatˆ = 0 is the unique steady-state. Setting * =ˆ for all ≥ in (9), we find that the incentive constraint reads = (1 − + ), a requirement that cannot be satisfied since we are focusing on cases where
0 cannot be incentive compatible as the agent would like to deviate by investing less than . However, such deviations are not feasible when * = 0 for all , and soˆ = 0 is indeed a rest point.
We now focus on 2-period cycles and conjecture that * follows cycles of period 2 where * = 0 when is even, and * = 0 when is odd. Using the notation
and taking into account the feasibility constraint ≥ 0, we see that the incentive compatibility constraint (7) holds when
These two conditions can be re-written as
is the unique action solving the two equations above.
Proof. Proposition 3:
We want to characterize deterministic dynamics near the steadystateˆ . Let ( ) = +1 denote the implicit map so that ( ) = ( ( )), where
Differentiating the incentive constraint (21) at the steady-state, we find that
where
The steady-stateˆ is locally stable if | 0 (ˆ ) | ∈ [0 1). Since the numerator in (27) is always higher than the denominator, the stability condition can be satisfied solely if the denominator is negative. Let us focus first on cases where the numerator is positive while the denominator is negative. Then it is easy to verify that 0 (ˆ ) ∈ (−1 0] whenever (22) is satisfied. The other possibility is that both numerator and denominator are negative, then
a condition that is actually more stringent than (22) .
Proof. Corollary 4:
The corollary immediately follows from the fact that investment at the steady-stateˆ = (1 − ) ( −1 − ) does not depend on the degree of risk aversion. Since
when the function is CRRA, and ( ) = when the function is CARA, it is easily seen that, in both cases, (22) is equivalent to imposing a lower bound on .
Proposition 5 can be proved in a similar way to Proposition 1. Thus we first use a direct approach by changing variable and defining a new fixed point problem.
Lemma 6 Let
2-period cycles are sustainable when the fixed point problem
admits a solution * such that ( ( * )) 0. In particular, when costs are quadratic so that ( ) = 2 2, the solution must belong to the following interval
Proof. Lemma 6: We focus on 2-period cycles and denote this period action by , next period by 0 the period after by , and so on. In other words, we have the discount factors from today til tomorrow and from tomorrow til the day after, respectively,
Therefore, if we start at = 0, so that is the action at = 0 2 4 6 and 0 the action for = 1 3 5 7 then the incentive constraint (7) 
( )
These simplify to
Thus there are 4 equations (30), (31), (32) , and (33), and 4 unknowns, ( 
Thus our problem is equivalent to looking for a fixed point in of the function ( ) defined in (29) . The solution is well defined when consumption is positive. In particular, when ( ) = 2 2, consumption is positive whenever ∈ (0 2), a requirement that is satisfied if
Proof. Proposition 5:
We separate between cases where the utility function is CARA and those where it is CRRA:
1. CARA: When ( ) = −exp(− ), it follows from the definition in (29) of (·) that
− since (¯ ) = 0 and (1 ¯ ) ∈ (0 1), we have (¯ ) 1.
By continuity of the mapping (·), there will be a fixed point ∈ (1 ¯ ) if 0 (1) 1 Differentiating (·), we obtain
2 ¶¸ ¶ and so
This expression can be simplified as (1) =ˆ = (1 − ) ( −1 − ) so that
Reinserting this equality into the previous equation we get
which implies in turn that
This allows us to conclude that the steady-state is stable since equation (27) with quadratic costs and CARA utility reads
where the last equality follows from expression of the rest-point (1) = (1 − ) ( −1 − ).
CRRA:
, it follows from the definition (29) of (·) that
− since (¯ ) = 0 and (¯ −1 ) 0 we have (¯ ) = 0. By continuity of the mapping (·), there will be a fixed point ∈ (1 ¯ ) if 0 (1) 1 Differentiating (·), we obtain
Reinserting (34), we get
which implies in turn that the steady-state is stable since equation (27) with quadratic costs and CRRA utility reads 
Consumption is Personal Consumption Expenditures in Billions of Dollars (PCE on FRED).
The 5-year bond yield is the 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GS5 on FRED).
Past inflation is calculated from the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-AUCSL_PCH on FRED).
Technical Appendix: Effect of discount factor on the stability of the steady-state Proposition 7 Assume that the utility function is CRRA and that costs are quadratic, i.e., Replacing the expression ofˆ into this condition yields 1 +˜ = 1 4
The left hand side is decreasing in˜ and goes from to (1 + ) as˜ increases from 0 to 1 By contrast, the right hand side is increasing and goes from 1 2 to infinity. Thus there exists a unique˜ solving (35) whenever (ii) If ∈ (4 2 4), the numerator (ˆ ) is always positive while the denominator (ˆ ) might be negative. Thus the steady-state is stable when 0 (ˆ ) ∈ (−1 0), i.e., when
As goes from 0 to 1, the first term of (37) starts at 0 and converges again to 0, while the second term goes from −1 to −(1 + ). Hence, the number of roots of (·) has to be even.
Differentiating (·) twice, one finds that . However, the strict concavity of (·), along with the terminal conditions (0) = −1
(1) = −1− , ensure that (·) has either zero or two roots in (0 1).
2.
1 2: Then 00 ( ) ≷ 0 ⇔ (2 − 1) (2 − 2 ) ≷ , and so the function (·) has a unique inflection point in (0 1). This implies in turn that the terminal conditions (0) = −1 (1) = −1 − can be satisfied solely if (·) has either zero or two roots in (0 1).
Having shown that (·) has at most two roots, we now establish a sufficient condition for their existence. The continuity of (·), and the fact that it is negative at both ends of the unit interval, imply that it is sufficient to identify a parametric restriction under which (·) reaches positive values within (0 1). A tractable expression is obtained focusing onˆ = 1 2, since
Thus, provided that 4 (2 − ), (·) has two roots ( ( ) ( )) ∈ (0 1) 2 . Furthermore, ( ) 0, and so the steady-state is stable for all ∈ ( ( ) ( )).
(iii) If 4, the numerator (ˆ ) and denominator (ˆ ) may become negative. However, the inequality (ˆ ) (ˆ ) ensures that 0 (ˆ ) = (ˆ ) (ˆ ) ∈ (0 1) whenever (ˆ ) 0, which implies in turn that must belong to ( ( ) ( )). Since 0 (ˆ ) is continuous over the interval [ˆ ( ( )) ˆ ( ( ))], we know that | 0 (ˆ ) | ∈ (0 1), implying that the steady-state is stable for all ∈ ( ( ) ( )).
